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Alston's Parity Thesis

A version of the parity thesis is clearly seen in Alston's work.
His strategy in some seminal essays is to embed the ju stification of
beliefs in the rationality of what he calls "epistemic (or doxastic)
practices. "1 He then argu es that the kind of ju stification available
for the practice that provides u s with beliefs abou t the physical
world is the same kind of ju stifi cation available for the practice that
generates beliefs abou t God. He fu rther argu es that the level or
strength of ju stification is the same. My goal in the present chapter
is twofold. First, I lay ou t the central tenets ofAlston's argu ment
in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " su pplementing
them with some claims made in two other essays and in Perceiving
God. Second, I provide the ou tline of a challenge to Alston' s posi
tion. Althou gh a fu ller and more developed accou nt of this chal
lenge is defended in Chapter 3, I su ggest here that if the challenge
is su ccessfu l, it calls for some distinctions within Alston's accou nt
of epistemic ju stification. These distinctions raise some qu estions
abou t Alston's version of the parity thesis.

1. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and "Religious Ex
perience and Religious Belief," Nous 16 (1982): 3-14. Of the two listed here, I
concentrate mostly on the first.
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Rationality and Theistic Belief
Epistemic Pra ctices a nd Bel iefs

In "Chr istian Exper ience and Chr istia n Bel ief' Alston intr oduces
the notion of an epistemic pra ctice. An epistemic pra ctice, he sa ys,
is "a more-or -less r egul ar and fixed procedur e of for ming bel iefs
under certain conditions, wher e the content of the belief is some
mor e-or -less deter minate function of the conditions. "2 The notion
of a pr actice is more basic tha n the notion of a bel ief insofar as one
consider s epistemic status. If one can show that a pra ctice is justi
fied (or tha t one' s engaging in a pra ctice is justified), then (typ
ically) by extension its del iver ances are justified. So Al ston' s centr al
concer n is whether we ar e epistemicall y justified in engaging in
cer tain epistemic pr actices.
He has two pr actices in mind. The fir st pr ovides us with (ma ny
of our ) bel iefs about the physical worl d; Al ston call s this "per cep
tual pr actice" (PP) or "sense per ceptual pr actice" (SPP or SP). 3 The
second provides (some of) us with beliefs a bout God; he call s it
"Chr istian pra ctice" (CP) and la ter introduces the notions of "mys
tical pr actice (MP) and "Chr istia n mystical practice" (CMP). 4
2.

Epistemic Justifica tion

Al ston cl aims that CP a nd PP ha ve the sa me kind of epistemic
justification.What kind of epistemic justifica tion do they ha ve? He
distinguishes two. Ther e is an evaluative sense of justifica tion, Je·
Her e the concer n is that one' s hol ding of a bel ief be l egitimate vis
a-vis the concer n for attaining truth and a voiding falsity; the con
cer ns are those of what Alston call s the epistemic point of view. If
2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 110. I use "epistemic
practice" and "doxastic practice" interchangeably.
J. He uses PP, SPP, and SP to refer to this practice. I prefer the first, but I use
the other abbreviations when they are more natural in quoting certain essays. The
reason for Alston's shift from PP to SPP or SP is that he later develops arguments
to the conclusion that one can perceive God, or at least that there is no reason to
think one cannot. Once having broadened the category of perception to include
access to God, Alston needed a more specific terminology by which to pick out the
perception of physical objects. The fullest treatment of the possibility of the per
ception of God is in Perceiving God.
4· Again the shift in terminology is at least partly because of Alston's need for
further specificity. The later two terms are introduced in Perceiving God. I use CP
unless another term is needed for ease of exposition.

Al ston 's Par ity Thesis
one is justified in hol din g a belief in this sense, then the cir cum
stan ces in which the bel ief ar e held ar e such that the bel ief is at l east
l ikel y to be true. Al ston admits that there is much wor k to be done
in discover in g what the var ious con dition s for Je ar e. But when
that wor k is don e, he says, what Je boils down to is a kin d of
reliabil ist un der stan din g of r ation ality: a belief is Je when it was
for med or is sustain ed by an epistemic practice that can be gen er
all y rel ied on to pr oduce true r ather than fal se bel iefs. 5
Je is to be con tr asted with a n or mative un der stan din g of justifica
tion , ]m which is n ormative in that it deal s with how well a per son
does in l ight of the n or ms requir ed of us simpl y in vir tue of bein g
cogn itive bein gs. We have, in shor t, some obl igation s an d duties
with respect to bel ief an d bel ief for mation because of the fact that
we are seekers of truth. Jn an d Je can be con tr asted in this way.
Consider a naive member of an isolated primitive tribe who, along
with his fellows, unhesitatingly accepts the traditions of the tribe.
That is, he believes that p wherever the tr aditions of the tribe, as
recited by the elders, in clude the assertion that p. He is ]n in doing
so, for he has no reason whatsoever to doubt these traditions.Ev
ery one he knows accepts them without question, and they do not
conflict with anything else he believes.And yet, let us suppose, this
is not a reliable procedure of belief formation; and so he is not ]c in
engaging in it. Conversely, a procedure may be in fact reliable,
though I have strong reasons for regarding it as un reliable an d so
would not be ]n in engaging in it; to do so would be to ignore those
reasons and so would be a violation of an intellectual obligation.•
Ther e is, then, a clear differ en ce between Jn an d Je·
A fur ther distin ction within the n or mative con cept of justifica
tion runs r oughl y par all el to the two position s taken in the William
James-W. K. Cl iffor d debate on the ethics of bel ief. Sin ce our goal
as epistemic bein gs is to seek the truth, Cl iffor d deman ds that one
ought n ot hol d a bel ief unl ess on e has adequate reason s for so do
in g. James den ies this cl aim, suggestin g that on e can hol d a bel ief
5· A fuller account of evaluative justification is available in Alston, "Concepts
of Epistemic Justification," and "An Internalist Externalism," in Epistemic Justifica
tion (the latter originally in Synthese 74 [I988): 265-83). I return to these essays in
Chapter 4·
6. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II5·
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unless one has some reason not to hold it. In effect, Cl ifford de
mands that we avoid as much error as possibl e, whereas James
affirms the search for as much truth as possibl e. These parall el a
strong version Gns) and a weak version G nw) of normative justifica
tion. The strong version has it that one is justified in engaging in a
practice if and onl y if one has reasons for thinking the practice
rel iabl e. On the weak version, one is justified in engaging in a
practice when there are no reasons for regarding the practice as
unrel iabl e. Some important rel ationships hol d among Je, ]ns• and
Jnw· Perhaps the most important of these is that if one sets out to
discover whether a belief or practice is Je then one is setting out to
discover whether one coul d be Jns in hol ding that bel ief or engag
ing in that practice.
Al ston makes two central claims. First, one is neverJns in engag
ing in either PP or CP because one cannot have adequate reasons
for supposing either practice to be Je· (It does not follow that one
or the other cannot be Je but onl y that one has no adequate reasons
to think it is. ) Second, both PP and CP can be Jnw for a person.
The answer to the question with which this section began-what
kind of epistemic justification do PP and CP share? -is, then, that
CP and PP share Jnw· Al ston' s version of the parity �hesis might
thus be described:
Parity ThesisAlston (PTA): Under appropriate conditions,
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jnw·
There is a natural extension to bel iefs:
Under appropriate conditions, both S's bel ief that p,
where p is a theistic belief, and S's bel ief that p*, where
*
p is a perceptual bel ief, are Jnw· 7
7· This extension, although tacit in Alston's suggestions in "Christian Experi
ence and Christian Belief," is perhaps incautious. Alston argues elsewhere that one
must be careful not to confuse levels when dealing with epistemological concerns;
what applies at one level may not at another. Although he writes in his earlier
essays that a belief is justified if and only if the practice that generates it is, as his
ideas develop it becomes clear that, although it may be rational for someone to
engage in a practice, that in itself does not entail that the beliefs generated by the
practice are justified. Rationality entails neither justification nor reliability. Alston
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Al ston does not intend his claims to be weak-kneed. First, PP
and CP have the same l evel (weak) and kind (normative) of justi
fication, and al though either CP or PP may be Je one cannot have
adequate reasons to think either is. 8 Second, he aims his sights
higher than simpl e epistemic neutral ity for PP and CP.His general
goal is to consider the "possibil ity that one' s experience can pro
vide justification sufficient for rational acceptance."9 Thus, al
though both PP and CP are epistemically permissible practices, this
kind of justification is intended to be understood as sufficient for
some sort of positive epistemic status. Epistemic permission to en
gage in a practice and, by extension, to hold beliefs thereby del ivered
is sufficient for epistemic acceptance of the delivered bel iefs, even
though one has no adequate reasons to take the practice to be Je·
3· The Justification of Perceptual Practice
Al ston describes the basic accounts phil osophers have given in
trying to show that PP is Je· He does not discuss any of these in
detail but notes their general fail ure to win the phil osophical day.10
Thus, the prospect of PP being Jns is not good. Furthermore, he
argues, in a later essay I discuss in Chapter 4, that if one practice can be shown to
be reliable they all can. Justification is easily had for just about any practice and
hence just about any belief Alston therefore shifts the question he asks about prac
tices away from the issue of justification to the issue of their rationality. This shift
allows him to evaluate the relative strength of our doxastic practices. It turns out,
then, that engaging in an epistemic practice should be evaluated in terms of ratio
nality and not justification, and thus some important questions need to be raised
about the "natural" extension suggested above or, perhaps better, about PTA itself.
To begin with, is it appropriate or worthwhile to speak of the justification of
practices (as opposed to beliefs)? Should we not rather speak of the rationality of
practices? And what does this mean for beliefs?
8. Perhaps PTA should include a clause noting that CP and PP share at least ]nw
in order to recognize that they both might be Jc· But Alston seems to suggest in
"Christian Experience and Christian Belie£'' that our knowledge that an epistemic
practice is Jc is limited and therefore that the strongest claim we can legitimately
make is that CP and PP are ]nw· See Chapter 4 for an explanation of Alston's
apparent change of mind on this matter.
9· Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II 1.
10. There is a fuller discussion in Perceiving God and an even fuller discussion in
Alston's forthcoming book on general epistemology (the latter of which is noted in
Perceiving God).
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suggests that as far as he knows no one has come up with any
good reasons to think PP is unreliable. There being, apparently, no
good reasons, PP is Jnw·
At this point Alston refers the reader to Thomas Reid' s work.
Reid suggests that the Creator endows human beings with a strong
tendency to trust their belief-forming practices, noting that no
practice can be provided noncircular reasons for accepting it as reli
able. Thus, if we "are to have any chance of acquiring knowledge,
we must simply go along with our natural reactions of trust with
respect to at least some basic sources of belief, provided we lack
sufficient reason for regarding them as unreliable. "11 Furthermore,
any appeal to one or another of those practices as more basic than
the others, with the goal in mind of justifying the less basic by the
more basic, is illegitimate. We have no reason to single out, for
example, the practice delivering self-evident beliefs as providing
more accurate access to truth than PP. D escartes' s strategy of pick
ing out one practice and using it to justify others is arbitrary. 12 PP
is Jnw and this, Alston claims, gives us at least some chance at
knowledge about the physical world.
4· The Justification of Christian Practice
D oes CP have the same kind of justification as PP? Is CPJnw? By
the nature of the case, one need not produce some set of reasons to
show that CP is Jnw · Nevertheless, CP is often not accepted as Jnw •
so some kind of account can be helpful. The best that can be done
is to present PP, which we accept as Jnw • alongside CP in order to
compare the two. If there are no differences signifi cant vis-a-vis
epistemic justification, then if one accepts PP as Jnw one can accept
CP as Jnw · 13 Alston argues that there are no such differences and in
effect, therefore, argues for the truth of PTA .
II. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II9.
I2. Alston does not wish to suggest that one cannot check what might be called
"subpractices" by a larger practice in which a subpractice is embedded. One might,
for example, check the reliability of a thermometer by the larger perceptual prac
tice.
I 3. One might think there is some sort of argument from analogy here, but I do
not think this is the case. Alston's comparision is merely a comparision; it is not
intended as an argument from the justification of one practice to the justification of
another.

Alston's Parity Thesis
Epistemic situations are often analyzed in the following way. In
stead of having empirical information pl ain and simpl e, it appears
that what we have is, on the one hand, a datum such as "I am
being appeared to in a computerish way" or "I seem to see a com
puter" or "A computerish sense datum is in my visual fiel d" and,
on the other hand, bel iefs such as that there is a computer in front
of me.How does one l egitimatel y move from the content of one' s
mental l ife to a cl aim about the (independentl y) existing physical
real ity? Supposedl y, the (independentl y existing) computer gen
erates the datum via some psychophysical process. Thus the em
pirical cl aim, "There is a computer in front of me, " is a hybrid
resul ting from the datum and an expl anation (via the mysterious
psychophysical process). But now we are in the difficul t position
with PP of having a bifurcation between experience and expl a
nation. Simil arl y with CP, the suggestion goes. One has certain
kinds of experience, such as it seeming to one that God cares for
us, and theol ogical expl anations, such as that God does care for us.
How is one to overcome either of these bifurcations?
Al ston registers his skepticism about the two standard ways by
which phil osophers attempt to overcome the bifurcation for PP.
Some try to show that the existence of the physical worl d is the
best expl anation of the data we have. But, says Al ston, it is un
l ikel y that one can "specify the purel y subjective experiential data
to be expl ained without rel ying on the 'independent physical
worl d' scheme in doing so, " and thus the expl anation route seems
cl osed.14 Neither does the phenomenal ist approach of taking physi
cal object bel iefs to be bel iefs about actual and possibl e sense expe
rience fare well , according to Al ston. The best move is to reject the
bifurcation al together and seek to justify the cl aim that we are in
direct contact with the objects of the physical worl d. He suggests a
parallel strategy for CP:
The question concerns the justifiability of a certain practice-the
practice of forming physical-object beliefs directly on the basis of
perception rather than as an explanation of what is perceived or ex

perienced.Another way of characterizing the practice in q uestion is
to say that it is a practice of using a certain conceptual scheme (the
"independently existing physical object" conceptual scheme) to spe
cify what it is we are experiencing in sense perception.If I may use

14. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 109.
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the term "objectification" for "taking an experience to be an experi
ence of something of a certain sort," then we may say that the prac
tice in question is a certain kind of objectification of sense experi
ence, an objectification in terms of independently existing physical
objects.Let us use the term "perceptual practice" (PP ) for our famil
iar way of objectifying sense experience. In parallel fashion I will
... use the term "Christian practice" (CP ) for the practice of objec
tifying certain ranges of experience in terms of Christian theology. 15

In the ca se of PP, the experience is taken to be a n experience of the
object itself a nd not merely a psychologica l da tum. Alston a lso
sa ys the believer takes himself to be directly a wa re of the object; he
does not cla im tha t the subject is directly a wa re. Further, Alston
suggests tha t we should understa nd our forma tion of physica l ob
ject beliefs simply by our "objectifica tion" of a ra nge of experience
in terms of certa in concepts. On his suggestion, the datum of the
experience generating physica l object beliefs is not expla ined by
reference to objective entities but is simply understood as a n expe
rience of those entities.
A brief detour is necessa ry here. In "Christian Experience a nd
Christia n Belief' Alston uses the la nguage of one' s ta king a n expe
rience to be a n experience of a certa in sort as opposed to the cla im
tha t one's experience is of a certa in sort. In his more fully orbed
theory of perception, however, he makes the following cla ims:
As I

see the matter, at the heart of perception (sensory and other
wise ) is a phenomenon variously termed presentation, appearance, or
givenness. Something is presented to one's experience (awareness ) as
so-and-so, as blue, as acrid, as a house, as Susie's house, or what
ever. I take this phenomenon of presentation to be essentially inde
pendent of conceptualisation, belief, judgment, "taking," or any
other cognitive activity involving concepts and propositions. It is
possible, in principle, for this book to visually present itself to me as
blue even if I do not take it to be blue, think of it as blue, concep
tualise it as blue, judge it to be blue, or anything else of the sort.

Thus Alston dista nces his theory of perception from those in which
the object of the experience is sa id itself to be constituted in pa rt or
in whole by the conceptua l fra mework a nd beliefs of the perceiver.
15. Ibid.
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Never theless, Alston's claims about pr esentation do not really af
fect his claims about PP and CP. In fact, Alston goes on to say:
"No doubt, in mature human per ception this element of pr esenta
tion is intimately inter twined with conceptualisation and belief, but
presentation does not consist in anything like that. " So, although
Alston holds that the object of per ception is a given, one' s concep
tual scheme can never theless influence how one takes the given:
It is essential not to confuse what appears with what it appears as.
My conceptualised knowledge and belief can affect the latter but not
the former. If to perceive X is simply for X to appear to one in a
certain way, and if the concept of appearance is unanalyzable, then it

would appear that we can enunciate no further conceptually neces
sary conditions for perception. But that does not follow. In declar
ing the concept of appearance (presentation) to be unanalyzable I
was merely denying that we can give a conceptually equivalent for
mulation in other terms; I was not denying that conceptually neces
sary conditions can be formulated in other terms.

Alston' s realism about the given should not be confused with the
suggestion that the given itself is all that is necessar y for per ceptual
exper ience. 16
Let us retur n now to consider PP. Alston' s point is that the data
of the exper iences gener ating physical object beliefs are not ex
plained by refer ence to objective entities but r ather such experi
ences ar e simply understood as experiences of those entities. So it
goes with CP as well. Alston is car eful to distinguish between "ex
periences in which the subject takes himself to be dir ectly aware of
God" and other inter esting cases in which someone is "simply . . .
disposed to believe . . . that what is happening in his exper ience is
to be explained by God' s activity. "17 How does the account of these
exper iences go? As we have lear ned, Alston uses the ter m "objec
tify" to stand for "taking a cer tain kind of exper ience as an exper i
ence of something of a cer tain sor t. " In the physical object case, we
take sense exper iences as experiences of physical objects (r ather
than psychological data). He suggests, then, that just as we for m
r6. Alston, "Experience of God: A Perceptual Model," paper delivered at the
Wheaton Philosophy Conference, Wheaton, Illinois, October 1989, pp. 2-4. A
fuller treatment of this topic is found in Alston, Perceiving God, chap. r.
17. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 107.
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physical object bel iefs directl y on the basis of perception so we
form theistic bel iefs directl y on the basis of theistic experience.
There is not to be, presumabl y, any inference from the one to the
other; the formation of bel ief is immediate. Thus, whenever we
have perceptual experiences, we take oursel ves to be in contact
with physical objects. Just so, whenever we have theistic experi
ences, we take oursel ves to be in contact with God or at l east his
activities. But how are we to understand "theistic experience"?
Alston says that a certain range of experience is objectified in
certain terms. What is this range of experience in the real m of
theistic bel ief? He suggests that there are certain Christian or rel i
gious experiences that can be objectified. He del imits the experi
ences about which he is concerned by setting aside what are typ
icall y called mystical experiences-those experiences sometimes
had by saints and ascetics. He is concerned more with experiences
open to the typical , l ay Christian. 18 He al so sets aside experiences
that might be described as visions. He does not wish to set aside all
sensory mediation-for exampl e, seeing the gl ory of God in the
mountains. Neverthel ess, he limits his final concern to what we
might call direct experiences of God. These experiences need not
be in the forefront of one' s consciousness, but they are not experi
ences from which one infers the presence of God. God is somehow
(to be taken as) directl y present, just as the tabl e to my l eft is (taken
by me to be) directly present.
Given this range of experiences, and Alston' s acc ounts of PP and
CP, how does the argument for PTA go? Clearly, PP is Jnw· It is
often suggested, however, that CP is significantly different from
PP, and these differences show that CP and PP do not have the
same kind of epistemic justification. Al ston writes:
I believe that many people are inclined to take CP to be discredited
by certain ways in whic h it differs from PP, by the lack of certain
salient features of PP. The se include the f ollowi ng:
I. Within PP there are standard ways of checking the accuracy of
any particular perceptual belief. If, by looking at a cup, I form the
18. This remains true even in Perceiving God, where Alston uses the rubric
"mystical practice" to name the subject of his concern, although at least some of
his examples in this more recent work are from what is thought of more stan
dardJY as the mystical literature. Still, his concern is not experiences of unity with
God but rather with experiences where God is taken to be present, in a sense
Alston specifies, to the experiencer's consciousness.
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belief that there is coffee in it, I can check this belief for accuracy by
smelling or tasting the contents; I can get other observers to look at
it, smell it, or taste it; I can run chemical tests on it and get other
people to do so.
2. By engaging in PP we can discover regularities in the behavior
of objects putatively observed, and on this basis we can, to a certain
extent, effectively predict the course of events.
3· Capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found universally among
normal adult human beings.
4· All normal adult human beings, whatever their culture, use
basically the same conceptual scheme in objectify ing their sense ex
perience.19
Alston responds in both a negative and a pos1t1ve way to these
supposed disanalogies between PP and CP. Only the negative re
ply need concern us for the present.
The conclusion of the negative reply is that PP's possession of
features I-4 is best seen "as a rather special situation that pertains
specifically to certain fundamental aspects of that particular practice
in this particular historical-cultural situation rather than as an in
stance of what is to be expected of any reliable epistemic practice."20
Alston's argument is roughly that although I-4 are features that
one might desire to have attached to an epistemic practice, it does
not follow that a practice's failing to have them is a reason to reject
the practice's claim to reliability. In fact, PP's possession of I-4
does not give us a reason to take PP as reliable.
To simplify matters, let us consider features 1 and 2 together and
then 3 and 4· Features I and 2 have the common focus of calling
attention to predictability, whereas 3 and 4 have the common focus
of calling attention to the universal human participation in the
practice.12 So first, I and 2. PP is what Alston calls a "basic prac
tice." It is a practice that "constitutes our basic access to its subject
matter. We can learn about our physical environment only by per
ceiving it, by receiving reports of the perceptions of others, and by
carrying out inferences from what we learn in these first two ways.
We can not know anything a priori about these matters, nor do we
19. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 121.
20. Ibid., p. 128.
21. This observation is made by Peter Van lnwagen in the abstract "Abnormal
Experience and Abnormal Belief," Nous 15 (1981): 13-14.
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have any other sort of experiential access to the physical world. "
Thus, if one tries to take features I and 2 as reasons for judging PP
to be reliable, one is involved in a "vicious circularity. "22 So no
adequate reason can be given.
As an alternative, Alston suggests that, although I and 2 do not
provide us with reasons for the reliability of PP, perhaps they be
token or manifest reliability. Thus, the first part of the anti-CP
charge reduces to the claim that I and 2 manifest reliability but that
CP lacks I and 2. Their absence is supposed to be a reason to reject
the reliability of CP. But surely it is not. If I and 2 are not neces
sary conditions for reliability, as Alston argues, then the only alter
native left for the anti-CP challenge is that I and 2 are general
features of reliability, features such that the absence thereof pro
vides at least prima facie reason to reject a practice as not reliable.
In response, Alston offers one central reason why we should not
think I and 2 are general features of reliable practices. This reason
is hinted at by the practice of pure mathematics. The practice of
pure mathematics does not allow for predictability precisely be
cause it does not deal with changing objects. This example indi
cates that "whether a practice could be expected to yield predic
tion, if reliable, depends on the kind of subject matter with which
it deals. "23 He then suggests that it is only accidental and not neces
sary to PP that predictability is built into it.
As for features 3 and 4, not everyone engages in the practice of
pure mathematics, so the claim that everyone engages in the same
epistemic practices is not true; universal participation need not be a
feature of a reliable practice. Also, it is not at all clear that all peo
ple of various cultures objectify experience in the way Western
people do. Alston admits that this is a controversial area, but since
the issue is unclear and, I might add, not even clearly decidable,
perhaps it should not be pressed on either side.
Given these considerations, although the presence of features I4 may be cognitive desiderata, their absence does not give us a
reason to reject the reliability of a practice failing to have them. PP
and CP thus have, according to Alston, the same kind of epistemic

22. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. I 17, 124.
23. Ibid., p. 127.
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justification, Jnw· Just as we have no reason to reject the reliability
of PP, so we have no reason to reject the reliability of CP.
5· Alstonian Theistic Experience
In the next section I introduce a challenge to PTA which I draw
from some recent philosophical work on the epistemic value of
my stical experiences.To develop the challenge, however, I need a
clearer explanation of Alston's account of experience. Experience,
whether in PP or CP, is such that the object of one's experience is
taken to be directly present.Alston resists any bifurcation of one's
belief formation into parts, claiming that one simply takes one's
experience to be of a certain object; one objectifies one's experience
immediately into the categories appropriate to that experience.
Sense experiences are objectified into phy sical object beliefs via the
independently existing phy sical object scheme. Theistic experi
ences are objectified into theistic beliefs via the (Christian) theo
logical object scheme.How should one understand the experiences
that the theist objectifi es into theistic belief?
Since the belief formation is noninferential, one expects the con
tent of the experience to be relevant to the content of the belief.
But what is the content of the experience? Here there appears to be
a certain looseness in Alston's presentation in "Christian Experi
ence and Christian Belief." Although he indicates early in his essay
that he does not want to rule out experiences in which one might
see the glory of God in majestic natural scenes or hear God speak
in the words of a friend, he later specifies that he is restricting
himself
to experiences in which the subject takes himself to be directly
aware of God, rather than simply being disposed to believe, how
ever firmly, that what is happening in his experience is to be ex
plained by God's activity. Thus if after responding to the Gospel
message, I find myself reacting to people in a different kind of way,
I may firmly believe that this is due to the action of the Holy Spirit
on my soul; but if I do not seem to myself to be directly experienc
ing the presence of the Holy Spirit, if I am not disposed to answer
the question "Just what did you experience?" or "Just what were
you aware of?" with something that begins "The Holy Spirit . .,
.

"

Rationality and Theistic Belief
then this experience does not fall within our purview . . . . No
doubt, this is often a difficult distinction to make. 24

The first examples indicate a certain overlap in experience be
tween theist and nontheist. For example, presumably both theist
and nontheist (can) see the natural scene and both (can) hear the
voice of the friend.In the remaining example, the nontheist pre
sumably does not react to people in a way different than before
hearing the gospel.This is an experience to which the nontheist has
no access.The question is whether Alston can include both kinds
of example-those in which there is an overlap of experience be
tween theist and nontheist and those in which there is no overlap.
In the cases in which a theist and a nontheist appear to be having
the same experience-viewing the beautiful mountains-but
where only the theist forms the belief that God made them or that
they reveal the glory of God, it may appear that there is an experi
ential overlap. But I think this is not the case. Insofar as Alston's
suggestions go, it seems that there must be two separate experien
tial contents, for if the experiential contents were the same for both
theist and nontheist then the difference in beliefs would need to be
explained either by a difference in inference and explanation added
to the experience or by the nontheist's failure to have a theistic
conceptual or belief framework. An inferential addition is not al
lowed by Alston's own case; the objectification is to be immediate.
And the failure of the nontheist to have the theistic conceptual or
belief framework seems at best an unlikely explanation. Presum
ably both theist and nontheist take the mountains to be present in
Alston's objectification sense. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
theist confuses the presence of mountains with the presence of
God. Even if the theist has some theistic conceptual or belief
framework the nontheist lacks, the theist needs some additional
(and different) content in her experience to objectify it legitimately
in theistic terms.It seems at least prima facie clear that the content
of the experience should be related to the content of the belief gen
erated. Just as I would deny , under normal circumstances, that
there is a tree in front of me while I am in a room with no view of
trees (i.e., while not having any experiences whose content in24. Ibid., pp. 107-8.
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eludes what I take to be a tree), so the theist should deny, under
normal circumstances, that she is in direct contact with God while
not having an experience the content of which she takes to be
theistic. The mere presence of mountains and a theistic framework
is not enough for the generation of a justified theistic belief.
Some comments from Perceiving God can help us here. Alston
writes:
What distinguishes perception from abstract thought is that the ob
ject is directly presented or immediately present to the subject so that
"indirect presentation" would be a contradiction in terms. To tease
out a concept of directness that has an opposite within the_ category
of presentation, let's go back to sense perception ....We can distin
guish directly seeing someone from seeing her in a mirror or on tele
vision. We have presentation on both sides of this distinction. Even
when I see someone in a mirror or on television, the person appears
to me as such-and-such, as smiling, tall, or smartly dressed. That
person can be identified with an item in my visual field.This con
trasts with the case in which I take something as a sign or indication
of X but do not see X itself (X does not appear anywhere within my
visual field), as when I take a vapor trail across the sky as an indica
tion that a jet plane has flown by. Here I don't see the plane at all;
nothing in my visual field looks like a plane. Let's call this latter
kind of case indirect perceptional recognition, and the former kind (see
ing someone on television) indirect perception. We can then say that
indirect is distinguished from direct perception of X by the fact that
in the former, but not in the latter, we perceive X by virtue of
perceiving something else, Y. In the indirect cases I see the person,
T, by virtue of seeing a mirror or the television screen or whatever.
On the other hand, when I see T face to face there is nothing else I
perceive by virtue of perceiving which I see T.25
Here Alston distinguishes between direct and indirect perception.
How do the two kinds of examples I noted from "Christian Expe
rience and Christian Belief' fit into the scheme from Perceiving
God? Alston says in Perceiving God that he once thought cases of
indirect perception and indirect perceptual recognition could not be
distinguished, as far as the object of the perception (or recognition)
was God. This indicates that when he wrote "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief' he meant to focus only on direct experiences.
25. Alston,

Perceiving God, pp. 2o-21.
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But Alston also tells us in the later work that some seminar stu
dents convinced him that, if God could appear to him as loving or
powerful or glorious when he is not sensorily aware of a field of
oats (or whatever), then God could appear to him as loving or
powerful or glorious when that comes through his sense percep
tion of the field of oats. Alston continues by noting that he has
nothing to say against this possibility.62
What is of importance here is that Alston now thinks that cases
in which God appears through something else, rather than directly,
can be classified as cases of indirect perception and need not be
classified as cases of indirect perceptual recognition. Nevertheless,
he makes it clear that his focus in Perceiving God is the possibility of
direct perception of God rather than the more complicated indirect
perception.His reason is that the former is a simpler phenomenon
than the later. Given this historical information, I believe it is safe
to suggest that Alston' s examples of experiencing God when hear
ing a friend' s voice or seeing a natural scene are best understood as
cases of indirect perception and that we are therefore right here to
understand Alston' s main concern to be the direct type of experi
ence of God. But we also learn that my way of passing over the
more complex cases of indirect perception of God may be too
easy. Perhaps there is something more going on in cases in which
one experiences God through hearing a friend' s voice or a beautiful
scene than some kind of inference or explanation added to the ex
perience.27
One way of spelling out Alston' s notion of direct experience
is the following.28 Suppose Alston is right and we do objectify
26. Ibid., p. 28.
27. I have more to say on this in Chapters 6 and 7, for I take Plantinga's exam
ples of experiencing God to be of this type, rather than the direct type. In short, I
attempt later to do some of the work on the more complex cases of indirect per
ception which are not Alston's focus.
28. Alston goes into some detail in accounting for various levels of immediacy
of perception in Perceiving God. He sums up his position by noting three grades of
immediacy: "(A) Absolute immediacy. One is aware of X but not through any
thing else, even a state of consciousness. (B) Mediated immediacy (direct percep
tion). One is aware of X through a state of consciousness that is distinguishable
from X, and can be made an object of absolutely immediate awareness, but is not
perceived. (C) Mediate perception. One is aware of X through the awareness of
another object of perception" (pp. 21-22). (A) is exemplified by awareness of a
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our experiences. He seems to have in mind a range of experience
united by some commonality; for example, in the physical object
case it is sensory experience that is common and, it seems, in the
theistic case the commonality is a sort of "theistic sense. " Although
Alston does not explicitly take note of it in "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief, " on analysis it appears that there is a kind of
link between sense perceptual experiences and physical object be
liefs, for example, between "I am appeared to treely" and "I see a
tree. " 92 This link need not and perhaps cannot be one of belief, at
least insofar as beliefs generate inferential beliefs, but there is a link
of the following sort. No one forming the belief "I see a tree"
would deny that she is being appeared to treely.The link is a sort
of linguistic or conceptual one.
Now, according to Alston's claims in "Experience of God: A
Perceptual Model" and in Perceiving God, the given in an experi
ence is not dependent on the perceiver's concepts or beliefs. Thus
caution is called for here. This linguistic-conceptual link to which I
am calling attention need not imply an antirealist theory of percep
tion or, for that matter, an antirealist metaphysic. Alston may be
right that in principle a tree may be present to me even if I do not
take it to be a tree, think of it as a tree, conceptualize it as a tree,
judge it to be a tree, or anything else of the sort.Nevertheless, it
seems true enough that, if I form the belief that I see a tree, I will
not deny that I am appeared to treely. 30 Thus, in distinguishing be
tween direct experiences and experiences of other kinds it is helpful
state of consciousness. (B) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan as he comes
within one's perceptual range. (C) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan's im
age on the television screen. I believe that what I have to say in the main text
provides one account of direct experience that could be spelled out in terms of
mediated immediacy or direct perception.
29. He does note the difficulty in specifying purely subjective experiences with
out reference to "schemes" in doing so; see "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief," p. 109.
30. A brief explanation of the terminology used in this context may be in order.
In this case, the "adverbial" construction is intended to call attention to the linguis
tic nature of the link without committing me to any existence claims. In its
broader use in epistemology, the point is to emphasize how I am appeared to rather
than how things appear to me; see Roderick Chisholm, Theory ofKnowledge, 2d ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 29-30, for a more detailed ex
planation of this terminology.
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to note that one can appeal to the language used to describe the
content of direct experiences. 3 1 It is a language relying on the phys
ical object conceptual scheme itself. If I take myself to see a tree
and go on to describe the experience underlying the formation of
the corresponding belief ("I see a tree" ), I use language such as "I
am appeared to treely. " The description of the experience makes
covert reference to the tree or, to make the point more general, to
the physical object. Let us give this link the name "lingo-concep
tual link. "
Now, one might suggest that there need not be a lingo-concep
tual link. For example, the experience could be described in terms
of patches of greenishness falling into certain patterns or having a
certain shape. But this seems an unlikely account. Our experience
is gestaltlike and does not seem reducible to the more basic compo
nents. At least, when asked why one thinks she sees a tree the reply
is something like "I am appeared to treely" and the account is not
typically given further analysis.
If there is a range of experiences picked out by the terms "theis
tic experience" or "Christian experience" (understood as direct ex
perience), one might surmise that the existence of a similar link can
be discovered in theistic belief formation. When the belief "God
wants me to love people more fully" is formed, the description of
the experience underlying it would, one might expect, make co
vert reference to theistic language-"being appeared to theistically. "
Thus the range of experiences to which Alston can point, given the
objectification scheme he describes, seems not to overlap in con
tent with the experiences of the nontheist. 32 Alston' s suggestions
seem to rule out understanding his examples as allowing both the
ists and nontheists to have the same experiential content in their
3 r. This seems true enough for beliefs expressed by perceptual verbs. But what
of straight physical object beliefs that might, as Alston suggests, be based on expe
rience, for example, "Suzie's house needs painting"? The link here is perhaps not as
direct, but there still is one. If my belief that Suzie's house needs painting is based
in experience, I must be looking at (or have looked at) Suzie's house. So "Suzie's
house needs painting" is linked to "I see (saw) Suzie's house needing paint," which
in tum is linked to "I am (was) appeared to in a Suzie's house-needing-paint-like
manner."
32. Whether it is best to describe such experiences as one experience with two
contents or as two experiences, one of which occurs at the same time as the other,
is not important here.
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experiences. So the experiences objectified by theists into theistic
belief are experiences only the theist has- or, at least if had by a
nontheist, they are ignored, explained away, or otherwise not ob
jectified.

6.

A Challenge to the Alstonian Parity Thesis

Two sorts of questions can be distinguished in a consideration of
perception-like theistic experiences. The first is whether the experi
ence is veridical as opposed to hallucinatory. The second is what
the experience (whether veridical or hallucinatory) is an experience
of, what the object of the experience is. The second question is
relevant here.
In an essay on mysticism, J. William Forgie isolates the phenom
enological content of the experience from other background beliefs
and "items of knowledge" which he calls the "epistemic base. "
When seeking to identify a person one sees, he argues, one must
make reference to the epistemic base. For example, to identify the
young man next door when one knows that identical twins Tom
and Tim Tibbetts both live there, one must rely on other back
ground information such as the fact that Tom is out of town this
week. Since experiences of both Tom and Tim Tibbetts are phe
nomenologically the same, knowing Tom is out of town allows
one to identify this young man as Tim Tibbetts. Thus a purely
phenomenological description of the experience could not take the
form "It was an experience of Tim Tibbetts." Such a description
must rely on the epistemic base.There is nothing in the phenome
nological experience that guarantees that this is an experience of
Tim rather than Tom, "or for that matter any of a number of other
things- a third 'look-alike, ' an appropriately made-up dummy,
or even a cleverly devised hologram- an accurate perception of
which could be phenomenologically indistinguishable from the ex
perience in question. "33
To show that no experience can be phenomenologically an expe
rience of God-that is, to show that "it's of God" cannot be a true
phenomenological description of any experience-Forgie employs
33. J. William Forgie, "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity,"
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion I 5 (1984): 13-30, quotation p. 14.
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"divide and

conquer"

st rat eg y . "God "

either a (disguised) d e finit e d es cri pti on

can be understood to be
or a proper name:

If it is a proper name, then if an experience is to be phenome
nologically of God, the content of the experience must guarantee
that its object is a certain unique individual, the one named by
"God, " and not any other. It must not be possible, that is, for the
experience to constitute an accurate "perception" of some individual
other than God. . . . On the other hand, if "God" is a description,
meaning (let us suppose ) "the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good
creator of the heavens and the earth, " then a theistic experience need
only be phenomenologically of some individual or other-it doesn't
matter which one-who satisfies that description. In this case it is
required only that it not be possible that the experience constitute an
accurate perception of something that fails to satisfy the description. 34

The first option, taking "God" to be a proper name, d oes not
provid e an account of how one could have a phenomenological
experien ce that guarantees that it is an experi ence of God. For such
a guarantee to be possible, one would have to i denti fy the object of
the experienc e as having what Forgie calls a "uniquely instantiable
property [UIP]." The only likely candidates for such pro pe rt i es are
those such as "being Socrates" or, in the t heis tic cas e, "bei ng
God. " But neither of thes e properties is giv en as part of a phenom
enol ogi cal e xpe rien ce itself, just as it is not given in the experi ence
of the young man next door that he is Tim rather than Tom Tib
bet ts. F orgie says that the point about sense experien ce can be put
in two ways:
(r) At best sense experiences are phenomenologically of things
that appear in a certain way, but since properties of the form "being
something that looks (sounds, feels, etc. )-or is capable of looking
(etc. )-this way" are not UIPs, sense experiences are not phenome
nologically of individuals.
(2) If a sense experience is to be phenomenologically of an indi
vidual, it is not enough that that individual have a UIP. It must have
a UIP of the form "being something which appears-or which is
capable of appearing-in a certain way. " It is because no object of
sense experience seems to have a UIP of that form that no sense
experience is phenomenologically of an individual.
34. Ibid., p. 16.
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Forgie admits that if mystical (theistic) experiences are radically un
like perceptual experiences then perhaps his argument is not rele
vant. Nevertheless, insofar as the analogy is accurate his point
seems to stand. Forgie also admits that he cannot provide an argu
ment to conclude that there are no UIPs of the sort in question.
Nevertheless, it seems at least unlikely that such UIPs are in the
offing given the following intuition: for any allegedly phenome
nological experience of God, there is a possible world in which
"the causal laws pertaining to the relations between possible objects
of 'perception' and the 'perceivers' of those objects are such that
some individual, not identical to God, is capable of appearing in
just the way displayed in the experience in question." In short, if
"God" is a proper name, then experiences that phenomenologically
guarantee that their object is God are not possible.35
The second possibility, taking "God" to be a disguised definite
description, fares no better. What is needed here for a phenome
nological experience to guarantee itself as an experience of God is
not that it be an experience of an individual but only that it be of
something having certain properties. In God' s case the properties
could be all-knowing, all-powerful, and so forth. Forgie first
makes the Humean observation that causation, whether of one
event causing another or of some agent causing some event or
some substance, is not phenomenologically in the experience. If
this is true, then there are difficulties with the suggestion that any
one could recognize something as having certain properties having
to do with powers or beliefs- all-powerful, all-knowing, and so
forth. Whether the properties have to do with powers or belief,
ultimately one's recognition of them depends on recognition of
causal relations:
The best candidate for an experience which is phenomenologically
of something having certain powers and beliefs is one which is phe
nomenologically of something manifesting those powers or expres
sing those beliefs.I f there can be no experience which is phenome
nologically of some power, or some belief, by itself, ... perhaps an
experience can be phenomenologically of something manifesting a
power or expressing a belief. I f so, then an experience itself could
guarantee that its object is something manifesting, and hence pos
-

35. Ibid., p. r8.
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sessing, that power, and also something expressing, and so having,
that belief. But here is where the earlier point about causation is
important. If causation is not phenomenologically presentable then
neither is agency. If some agent is manifesting a power or expres
sing a belief, that agent is causing something to happen, producing
some state of affairs. But if no experience is phenomenologically of
someone's causing or producing a state of affairs (as opposed to that
state of affairs simply co-existing with the agent or coming into
existence while the agent is present ), then no experience will be phe
nomenologically of someone manifesting a power or expressing a
belief. So the best candidate for an experience which is phenome
nologically of something having certain powers or beliefs turns out
not to be up to the job.36

ge ne ra l poi nt is tha t there i s nothi ng i n the phenomenologi ca l
the experience a lone tha t enti tles the perceiver to clai m
tha t i t i s an e xpe rien ce of God, whether "God" i s understood to be
a di sgui sed defini te descri pti on or a proper na me .
Ba sed on the kinds of suggesti on s Forgi e makes, I propose the
followi ng ch a llen ge to PTA. PP a nd CP do not ha ve the sa me
strength of e pi ste mic justi fica ti on, si nce CP, unlike PP, requi res
a role for ba ckground beliefs for the gen era tio n a nd jus ti fica ti on
of i ts delivera nces. Thi s specia l role for CP' s ba ckground beli efs
wea kens the level of strength of justi fica tion for CP-genera ted be
li efs. Thi s is not to say tha t beli efs deli vered by CP a re not justi
fied, nor even tha t they a re not Jn · Nevert he les s they a re not as
st ro ngly justified a s PP-deli vered beli efs. Ca ll thi s the "ba ckground
be lief ch a llen ge . "
Thi s ch a llen ge suggests tha t, i nsofa r a s Alston mea ns for his a c
count of belief forma ti on to be a n a ccount of noninferentia l belief
forma ti on in vol vin g only a n objecti fica ti on of e xperien ce, then
perha ps there i s a need for more cla ri ty a bout the noti ons of "non
inferential" and "objecti fica tion" to whi ch Alston a ppea ls . Thei sti c
beli efs a ppea r to depend i n some wa y o n a set of ba ckground be
liefs. The ba ckground belief cha llenge suggests tha t any ti me one
forms a G ustified ) belief a bout a n i ndivi dua l qua epistemi ca lly i den
tifia ble i ndi vi dua l (as well, I thi nk, a s about a n i ndi vi dua l' s a ction
qua uniquely a ttri buta ble to tha t i ndivi dua l), the belief is inferentia l
or i nterpretive; or a t lea st, i f noni nferentia l, i t relies in some epi The

aspect of

,

36. Ibid., pp. 20-2 1 .
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stemical ly significant way on backgrou nd beliefs as opposed to re
ly ing merely on the application of a conceptu al scheme. 37 I argu e
below that some of ou r doxastic practices do indeed involve an
epistemically significant place for backgrou nd beliefs, bu t where
the backgrou nd beliefs do not form an inferential basis for the be
lief generated.
A second issu e arises in connection with the backgrou nd belief
challenge. Let u s grant that CP does involve backgrou nd beliefs. Is
the same not tru e for the generation of PP beliefs? And if so, are
not the teeth of the challenge removed? Alston himself presents
several way s in which backgrou nd beliefs may enter into PP. I
argu e in Chapter 3 that there is a special position for backgrou nd
beliefs in CP that PP does not requ ire, thu s defending the chal
lenge. Bu t first there are distinctions and observations to be made.
In most of ou r waking hou rs, we find ou rselves engaged in PP.
The beliefs it generates tou ch mu ch of what we believe in general
and virtu ally all we believe abou t the phy sical world and its fu rni
tu re. PP delivers beliefs abou t all kinds of phy sical objects: hou ses,
rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, compu ters, and sweet pota
toes, to name only a minu scu le nu mber. It also delivers beliefs
abou t particu lar hou ses, rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, and
sweet potatoes. In many cases, the beliefs generated by PP come
and go, and the objects we form beliefs abou t are not important
enou gh for u s to name or otherwise identify so as to be able to
reidentify them. For example, if I am in a new city , being driven
throu gh its streets, PP may lead me to believe all sorts of things
abou t the new phy sical environment in which I find my self. For
the most part, however, I do not pay enou gh attention so that later
I might be able to sort ou t one hou se from another, as far as my
beliefs abou t them are concerned. Unless, in short, there is some
thing spectacu lar abou t a given phy sical scene or u nless I have
some specifi c reason or need to remember information abou t a
given bit of the phy sical environment, I simply do not form beliefs
abou t objects which are focu sed on allowing me to reidentify the
object. Still, I may be forming many beliefs via PP as I drive
37· Alston himself allows for the possibility of mediate or indirect justification
of beliefs by their relation to other beliefs. And not all these need be inferential. See
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 101.
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aroun d the city, an d these beliefs classify the objects of my experi
en ce in to kin ds of thin gs with certain properties n ot shared with
any others.
What I wish to emphasize is n ot the classificatory type of belief
just n oted but what I call "epistemically un ique in dividual beliefs"
(where it is the object of the belief that is in dividual, n ot the be
liefs). I mean by the term "epistemically un ique in dividual" n ot
simply on e of a kin d but on e of a kin d with certain un shared prop
erties an d iden tifiable an d r eiden tifiable as such. CP delivers beliefs
about such an object.The focus of CP is on ly on e kin d of thin g, a
divin e en tity.An d CP delivers beliefs about the on ly member of its
kin d, God.38 (Note the pr omin en t place of discussion of proper
n ames an d defin ite description s in Forgie' s argumen t.) The central
ity in CP of a un ique in dividual who is (taken to be) iden tifiable
an d reidentifiable is d ear. But n ot on ly is he cen tral, the en tire
epistemic practice is oriented toward formin g beliefs about this sin 
gle in dividuaP9
This is quite differen t from PP, where beliefs are gen erated
willy-nilly about coun tless thin gs (an d even countless kin ds of
thin gs), man y of which we do n ot bother to iden tify as the un ique
in dividuals they are but rather on ly classify as members of a certain
kin d. Contrast "I see the white rock n ext to the oak in my fron t
yard" with "I see a rock." The latter can be un derstood merely to
classify the object of my experien ce as bein g a member of a certain
kin d or, in so doin g, to attribute certain properties to the object.
The former picks out the object of my experience as the in dividual
rock it is-the white on e beside the oak in my fron t yard. Pre
sumably, beliefs gen erated by CP are closer to the latter than to the
former, that is, closer to epistemically un ique in dividual beliefs
than to classificatory beliefs. On e reason for this may simply be
that there is on ly on e divin e in dividual, God.40
38. God may not be the member of a kind; if he is not, then CP does not deliver
beliefs about any kind of thing, but about a very special thing.
39. This is not to say that no other individual would ever play a role in CP. I
might sense that God wants me to love my wife more, for example. The point is
that God is the focal point of CP.
40. Even in classificatory beliefs one is classifying a unique individual as a rock,
tree, or something else. But the point is the focus or emphasis of the beliefs con
tent, not simply the object of the belie£
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There i s much more to say about thi s di fference between PP and
CP, but for now we can mer ely i ntroduce the i ssues that ar e the
focus not only of the di scussi on of PTA but of the challenge to
Refor med epi stemology's emphasis on pari ty i n gener al. The dif
fer ence between CP and PP is that the for mer i s solely ori ented
towar d beliefs about an epi stemi cally unique i ndi vi dual, the latter
i s not so ori ented. This di ffer ence requir es, i n tur n, a speci al epi
stemi c r ole (yet to be fully speci fied) for backgr ound beliefs i n the
gener ati on of CP's deliverances.Thi s speci al place for background
beli efs i s absent i n the gener ati on of a good many, if not all, of
PP's deli verances. D o backgr ound beli efs have a speci al positi on i n
CP that they do not have i n PP, and i f so, i s thi s posi ti on epi
stemi cally i mportant? I tackle these questi ons i n r ever se or der,
postponi ng a full i nquir y into the for mer question unti l the next
chapter.For now, let me assume an affir mati ve answer to the fir st
questi on and go on to di scuss an answer to the second.
Let us assume that PP and CP differ on the place of backgr ound
beliefs i n the gener ati on of G usti fied) beli efs.As a preli mi nary r un
towar d getti ng at the suspi ci on that the di fferi ng r oles of back
gr ound beliefs ar e epi stemi cally i mpor tant, let us di sti ngui sh be
tween thr ee ki nds of belief for mati on. The fir st i s that of Alston's
objecti ficati on; these beli efs ar e the result of a li ngo-conceptual
scheme alone being applied noni nfer enti ally to experi ence. Let us
call these "conceptual-r eadi ng beli efs" and their correspondi ng
pr acti ces "conceptual-reading practi ces. " The second ki nd ar e those
beliefs for med i nferenti ally; these beli efs ar e the result of consci ous,
di scur si ve (deducti ve, i nductive, or i nter pretive) reasoni ng.Let us
call these "i nferenti al beliefs" and their correspondi ng practi ces "i n
ferenti al pr acti ces. " The third ki nd i s noni nferenti al but where
somethi ng more than concepts ar e appli ed to experi ence; concepts
and substanti ve beliefs ar e appli ed, albei t noni nferenti ally, to expe
rience. One's epi stemi c base includes backgr ound i nfor mati on (i n
the for m of beli efs) that i s used, along wi th concepts, to generate
beli efs. Let us call these "noni nferenti al medi ated beli efs" and the
corr espondi ng pr actices "noni nferenti al medi ated pr acti ces. "
Although we can allow that all these modes of belief gener ati on
can pr ovi de us wi th justified beliefs, i t mi ght still be the case that
conceptual-r eadi ng beli efs have a pri vi leged posi ti on. We are, in
fact, attracted to these noni nferenti al, merely conceptually read be-
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l iefs. We give them a special place in our epistemic hierarchies. The
reason for this is a kind of Cartesian worry about inferences or
interpretations. Conceptual -reading bel iefs simpl y have the l east
chance of going astray. In cases of inference, the l onger and more
compl icated the reasoning, the more l ikel y one is l ed down the
epistemic garden path. One thus suspects that, even where the rea
soning is not inferential or even conscious, the more compl icated
the intell ectual moves, the more l ikel y one is to go astray. Further
more, the bel iefs required for the inferences and interpretations of
ten, perhaps al ways, themselves need justification. Shoul d we not
suspect that any bel iefs required for Al ston' s CP objectifications
al so need to be justified (or have justification), whereas our basic
conceptual schemes, as used in PP, do not? What then of the non
inferential mediated bel iefs? I suspect that these are in a sort of
hal fway house between conceptual-reading and inferential bel iefs.
The epistemic justification for noninferential mediated beliefs, al 
though not as strong as the justification for conceptual -reading be
liefs, is not as weak as the justification for inferential bel iefs. N one
of this is to say that any of these three kinds of bel ief is not justi
fi ed; it is onl y to note a ranking of strengths of justification.
According to Al ston, the objectification of perceptual experience
via a conceptual scheme does not invol ve discursive reasoning, ex
pl anation, interpretation, or any appeal to background bel iefs, at
l east in a l arge number of cases. In contrast to this, as I argue l ater
(see Chapter 3 , Section 2), forming bel iefs about Tom and Tim
Tibbetts or God always invol ves at least a noninferential role for
background bel iefs. The l atter seem to be, once again (see Chapter
8, Section 1), at l east sl ightl y l ess high on the epistemic l adder than
the former, and bel iefs about epistemically unique individuals (at
l east where these do not derive from PP)41 therefore do not appear
to have the same epistemic status as bel iefs formed via Alston's
objectification. According to PTA the two kinds of bel iefs (percep
tual and theistic), given appropriate circumstances, not onl y have
the same kind of epistemic justification but also the same l evel or
strength of that kind. It seems that the justification attached to con
ceptual -reading bel iefs may be (sl ightl y) stronger than that attached
41. PP can give us beliefs about epistemically unique individuals, but these do
not require background beliefs. At least that is what I argue in Chapter J.
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to noninferential mediated beliefs. But then, if PP prov ides a non
inferential conceptual reading of experience whereas CP does not,
then CP and PP do not share the same epistemic lev el.And this is
true ev en if they share the same kind of justification, namely, Jn·
Ev en granting this initial description of the two kinds of case, is
this argument not just a quibble ov er matters of little significance?
Perhaps beliefs deliv ered v ia noninferential mediated belief genera
tion are, for all intents and purposes, Jnw · Since Jnw merely de
mands that there not be reasons to reject the epistemic practice as
unreliable, discov ering that a practice appeals to background beliefs
does not show that the practice is not Jnw· T he definition of Jnw
simply makes no reference to how the practices work. Perhaps by
the letter of the law Alston is correct and PTA is true. Nev erthe
less, the distinctions noted here seem to indicate some need for a
more finely tuned notion of Jnw and the parity thesis in which it is
embedded. Are there not further gradations of justification within
the weak v ersion ofJn? And do these not rely on the internal work
ings of the practices? Alston himself hints at such a possibility
when he admits that features 1-4 (those attached to PP but not to
CP) are "desiderata for an epistemic practice. If we were shaping
the world to our heart' s desire, I dare say that we would arrange
for our practices to exhibit these features. . . . T hings go more
smoothly, more satisfyingly, from a cognitiv e point of v iew where
these features are exhibited. Since PP possesses these v irtues and
CP does not, the former is, to that extent and in that way, superior
from a cognitiv e point of view."42
T his cognitiv e superiority does not push PP beyond Jnw· Neither
does CP' s lack of it keep CP from being Jnw · In fact, after this
suggestion Alston goes on to argue that the features that generate
or allow for this cognitiv e superiority are not necessary for re
liability. But surely Alston' s comment indicates the possibility of
some ranking within Jnw · Within this possibility it is natural to
suggest that noninferential mediated practices do not share the
same strength as conceptual-reading practices, at least, one can say,
from a cognitiv e point of v iew. T hus, although PTA is true as a
general claim, further refinement indicates a ranking within Jnw by
which CP turns out to be less attractiv e than PP. Is this lack of
42. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24.
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attractiveness more than a cognitive issu e? Is it an epis temic one? I
have sugges ted an intu itive cas e for its being epis temic bu t have
not dev eloped the idea fu lly. Let me s imply s tate here that I believe
the issu e is an epis temic one becaus e the backgrou nd beliefs need
jus tifi cation.
The issu e of whether backgrou nd beliefs need jus tification is an
important one, bu t I pos tpone a dis cuss ion of it, and s ome fu rther
refinements of the notions of conceptu al-reading and noninferential
mediated practices and beliefs , u ntil Chapters 6 and 7· For now,
assu ming that that promiss ory note is su ccess fu lly paid, and that
PP and CP do in fact differ on the role of backgrou nd beliefs , we
can su gges t that PTA is , s trictly s peaking, fals e, for there are cogni
tive and epis temic rankings within Jnw that PTA does not recog
nize. In the next chapter I argu e that PP and CP do differ on the
role of backgrou nd beliefs .

